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1.  Introduction 
Over the last forty to fifty years most OECD countries experienced top tax rate falls 
coupled with an increase in the top income earners’ share of GDP. In the US for instance the 
top marginal wage tax rate fell from 90 % in the early sixties to a current top marginal tax rate 
around 35%. In the same period the US top 1% of earners income share rose from 
approximately 8% to approaching 20%. Atkinson and Leigh (2010), find significant effects of 
tax changes on the very richest in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
the United States in the period 1970 to 2000. Their study finds a co-movement of top 1% 
income and the marginal tax rates in these countries and estimates the changes in the tax rates 
over this period can account for between one third and one half of the increase in the shares of 
the top 1% income groups.1  
This paper seeks to use tournament theory to gain new insight for the empirical regularity 
outlined above. It is as such the first article to investigate the effects of taxes on wage spreads 
within rank order tournaments, when the participating workers are risk averse. It extends 
traditional theory and provides an illustration of how competing employees’ effort level 
responses to changes in taxation depend on their level of risk aversion. This then is shown to 
have important knock-on implications for the firms’ design of tournaments and their choice of 
the wage spread between winners and losers when taxes change. Thus the model sheds light 
on the impact of labour taxes on the distribution of wages within firms, providing a useful 
framework that may help to explain some of the movement of top earners’ income in response 
to changes in labour taxes over the last half century or so. 
Ask a simple tournament related question: Does a proportional tax imposition increase 
or reduce effort levels? In the standard literature where competitors are risk neutral the 
answer is simple. It will reduce effort level, as the proportional tax will effectively reduce the 
                                                          
1 Whilst the marginal tax rates of labour have fallen, Piketty and Saez (2007) indicate that progressivity has also 
been affected by a drop in corporate, estate and gift taxes. See Piketty and Saez (2001) and (2003) for further 
discussions on the determinants of income distribution. 
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difference between, that is the spread of, the after tax wages of winners and losers in the 
tournament. With risk aversion, and its accompanying diminishing utility of state contingent 
consumption, the answer is somewhat more complicated. Whilst imposing a proportional tax 
rate reduces the monetary difference between winning and losing, it also reduces the state 
contingent income levels to where the marginal utility of net income is greater. Though the 
wage spread falls, the difference in utility between winning and losing may actually rise under 
certain circumstances. This in turn implies that an increase in the proportional tax rate may 
increase the supply side effort level of workers rather than decrease it as previously found. 
How workers respond to taxes will then impact on the firms’ demand side decisions of how to 
set the wage spread.   
Whilst tournament theory has been used to explain why workers are paid progressively 
more within a firm hierarchy, the literature has little to say about how the wage distribution is 
affected by changes in taxation with one main exception by Persson and Sandmo (2005). The 
main and ex ante surprising insight of their paper is that firms respond to the reduction in the 
take home wage spread, a higher marginal tax rate implies, by increasing the pre and 
sometimes post wage-tax distribution. Thus taxes which are meant to redistribute may have a 
perverse effect on equity. Though their result is intuitively appealing, it does not fit recent 
decades’ empirical experience of increasing inequity with falling top marginal tax rates. Our 
paper extends the Persson and Sandmo analysis and illustrates that their result does not 
necessarily hold. The model that follows demonstrates their result is valid only when workers 
are sufficiently risk averse under the condition means tested transfers from the state, and that 
with low levels of risk aversion their result may be reversed.  
We apply the tournament theory in the rank order tradition by Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), since it is a particular good candidate for explaining wages at the upper levels of a firm’s 
hierarchy and by implication the behaviour and wage outcome of top earners. The theory 
predicts, see e.g. Rosen (1986), that there will be an increasing ratio of pay between stages in a 
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firm’s hierarchy. Evidence of this is found in the empirical work by Bognanno (2001), who finds 
pay rises strongly with hierarchical level. Furthermore, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1993), 
(1994a) and (1994b) find most hiring occurs at the lower levels of a firm, indicating that the 
internal labour market implied by tournament models may be more appropriate at higher 
levels within a firm hierarchy where there is less use of outside hires. They also show that 
salary as a function of level is increasing and highly convex as predicted by tournament theory. 
In this they are not alone. Lambert et al. (1993) also offer support for the convexity of the pay 
structure, whilst Eriksson (1999) similarly found a stable convex relation between Danish 
compensation and the level of jobs in a hierarchy.  
Whilst most articles in the literature on contests assume risk neutrality some authors 
have considered risk aversion, such as for instance Skaperdas and Gan (1995) and Cornes and 
Hartley (2003). Though there in addition are some rank order tournament models in the 
labour market literature where risk aversion play a role these are relatively few.2 The risk 
neutrality imposition most commonly assumed in the literature has the advantage of 
computational simplicity and clarity in results at virtually no sacrifice or cost. Indeed the usual 
effort inducing effects arising from a higher wage spread or lower levels of noise under risk 
neutrality see an easy transfer to tournament models with risk aversion. Yet the application of 
realism through the utilisation of risk aversion really does matter to the predictions of the 
question of how taxes affect tournaments. In part it is this realisation that clearly distinguishes 
this study from Persson and Sandmo (2005), who rely on the assumption of risk neutral 
workers, which implies workers will invariably reduce effort levels in response to the tighter 
spread between the loser’s and the winner’s take home wage that follows an imposition of or 
                                                          
2
 Whilst the initial rank order tournament exposition by Lazear and Rosen (1981) discusses risk aversion, 
most papers in the subsequent literature assumes risk neutrality with little loss of generality. There are 
however some notable exceptions,  such as Kränkel (2008) who investigates risk taking with risk 
aversion in tournaments, and Green and Stokey (1983) who contrast the outcomes of contracts versus 
tournaments when workers are risk averse. 
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increase in the marginal tax rate on labour income. In contrast we will demonstrate that this is 
not always the case here. 
What follows is a demonstration of how the qualitative directions of effects are 
critically dependent upon the degree of risk aversion. When risk aversion is high enough, we 
will demonstrate that workers increase their effort in response to the lower wage spread 
induced by a rise in taxes. Whilst this is a result of some straight forward intuition, it is on the 
face of it a surprising result as it seems to suggest that it is the more risk averse workers who 
will reduce their self-protective effort, in response to an increase in the wage spread due to a 
reduction in taxes. This paper is thus linked to papers such as Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) 
and Konrad and Skaperdas (1993), who find that the level of self-protection may fall with 
higher risk-aversion. Also relevant is Skaperdas and Gan (1993), who find in contests of limited 
liability that participants who are more risk averse exert higher effort than the less risk averse 
contestants. 
The paper is further linked to the literature that seeks to investigate the underlying 
causes of the observed increase in top executive remuneration. Whereas Bebchuk et al. (2002) 
suggest that it is managerial power and rent seeking of executives at the expense of 
shareholders and owners that has driven the rise in CEO pay, Murphy and Zábojnik (2004) 
suggest it is driven by increased competition for top executives. Similar competitive measures 
are present in Gabaix and Landier (2008) who link CEO pay to firm size. We offer an 
alternative approach and suggest a theoretical tax and tournament argument for why a firm, 
with high paid tournament contesting employees, may have increased the wages for these 
individuals in response to tax changes. 
With females exhibiting different risk attitudes than males, one could expect to see a 
difference in the female-male wage differentiation in the upper echelons of a firm’s internal 
labour market structure as for instance argued in Kulich et al. (2011).  It is as such linked to 
literature that suggest female CEO’s are likely to be paid less than their male counterparts as 
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outlined in several studies such as Bartlett and Miller (2005) and Wanzenried (2006). 
Arulampalam et al. (2007) find further the gender pay gap increases as one moves up the wage 
distribution. Whilst we will not directly comment on the pay gap, we will discuss the effect 
taxation has on the wage spread within a tournament, and thus by implication draw tentative 
conclusions as to the likely effect it has on the payoff spread between winning and losing 
females.  
Our unusual result that it is possible to find effort increasing in response to a reduced 
spread of after tax wages, can be linked to a growing literature that questions the relationship 
between performance related pay and effort. A recent example of this is Kvaløy and Olsen 
(2014), who show that uncertainty in the enforcement of contracts may lead to less effort but 
stronger incentives being offered by firms, thus potentially generating a negative association of 
effort and performance related pay. There is also a literature where extrinsic incentives can 
crowd-out the intrinsic desire to conduct one’s duties, see the survey by Frey and Jegen (2001) 
for early work. Other works include Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson 
(2008), where high powered incentives, such as performance related pay, may destroy the 
prosocial behaviour of the agent/worker. Lack of pro-social behaviour could in a tournament 
setting lead to further erosion of the effort payment relationship through industrial politics 
mechanisms, outlined in Lazear (1989), which demonstrates how wage compression can arise 
in order to avoid undesirable sabotage activities between workers in a firm. Finally, a question 
whether the observed difference in effort is due to selection rather than incentives is still 
unresolved in the literature. For instance in an empirical study of rank order tournaments, 
Leuven et al. (2011) find no effort effect of prizes when they control for sorting of workers. 
A further strand of literature that relates to our paper includes work by Rodriguez 
(1998) and Moene and Wallerstein (2001), who find more redistribution in countries that have 
a higher degree of wage dispersion prior to taxes being imposed. There may be several reasons 
for this. Guvenen et al. (2014) for instance argue that human capital returns are lower in more 
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progressive tax regimes and find human capital accumulation differences can account for 
about half the difference in wage distribution between US and Europe. Whereas some 
theoretical models in the political economy tradition, Benabou (2000) and Hassler et al. (2003) 
who discuss multiple equilibria, find equitable societies favour a higher degree of 
redistribution, others follow the tradition of Meltzer and Scott (1981) where a high mean 
income relative to the income of the median voter, that is higher inequality, will lead to more 
redistribution. We propose an alternative theory, where the wage dispersion within 
tournaments is endogenous and an increase in tax progressivity imply a tighter (wider) wage 
dispersion when risk aversion is low (high) enough. 
Whilst tournament theory provides a convincing method to investigate the matter at 
hand, other potential explanations may contribute to our understanding of the negative 
correlation between top earner share and tax rates, see Matthews (2011). First, it should be 
noted that top income shares in empirical studies are typically based on declared income 
levels. Since there is less to be gained from evading and avoiding when taxes fall,  it is possible 
the data may simply reflect that declared income, keeping actual income constant, is 
negatively related to tax rates. Second, the ease at which wealth is accumulated may rise with 
lower taxes. Thus as taxes fall the share of GDP attributed to the richest segments of society 
increases. A third argument is related to labour market incentives. Meghir & Phillips (2010) 
argue that taxes and the incentive to exert effort of high earners may be negatively related. 
They make a distinction between working hours and effort and contrast their argument to 
standard labour supply theory where it is quite possible that increases in taxes yield stronger 
incentives of high income earners’ to work more hours whilst they at the same time exert less 
effort. We do not consider such aspects but add instead to this debate by exploring a simple 
tournament model with worker risk aversion, which provides a separating condition for tax 
reductions to cause a rise in top income wages.   
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Since the degree of risk aversion is particularly important in this paper, we proceed by 
providing a short broad brush approach of evidence on risk aversion in section 2. Section 3 
offers a diagrammatical presentation, whereas Section 4 proceeds with a more formal 
exposition of the workers’ effort response to tax changes. Section 5 discusses firm behaviour 
and its choice of wage spread. Finally Section 6 offers some concluding comments. 
 
2. Empirical estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficient. 
Our model will demonstrate that the separating condition for effort to fall or rise with 
taxes is a relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient sufficiently above one. Finding a RRA less 
than one implies effort falls as taxes rise, whereas effort will increase when the RRA is 
sufficiently greater than one. To relate our results to the real world we turn to some available 
evidence. Studies have utilised many different contexts to elicit risk preferences. These include 
consumption and investment behaviour, insurance markets, labour markets, pensions, 
television game shows and laboratory experiments. The RRA coefficients vary considerably in 
this literature, with values falling both above and below unity. Rather than providing a 
comprehensive survey, we discuss instead a very limited selection of papers to indicate the 
variability in the RRA.  
An early study by Friend and Blume (1975) argues the RRA coefficient exceeds 2. Hansen 
and Singleton (1982) consumption study finds it falls below unity, whereas the investment 
study by Hansen and Singleton (1983) finds that most estimates are in the 0.26 and 2.7 range. 
Lottery studies by Eisenhauer and Venturaz (2003) for Italy estimate a RRA coefficient ranging 
between 4.5 and 13.8, and Booij and van Praag (2009) for the Netherlands find it varies 
between 2 and 82. In Sweden, Pålsson (1996), the RRA coefficient is estimated to be in the 
range between 2 and 10. In a model of labour supply Chetty (2006) argues that the RRA 
coefficient is bounded to be less than 2. Recent evidence in a labour market context includes 
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the finding by Goerke and Pannenberg (2012) stating an average individual relative risk 
measure of 3.04 for trade union members and 2.81 for non-members.  
Meyer and Meyer (2005) review literature evidence and provide a convincing argument 
that the large variation in relative risk aversion could be due to differences in the 
measurement of outcomes, such as wealth and returns of investment. For instance, it matters 
to the estimation of the RRA coefficient whether human capital is included in the wealth 
measure. They further demonstrate that much of the variation between studies largely 
disappears after correcting for these measurement differences, resulting in a RRA coefficient 
for wealth that tends to be near but always greater than unity. 
Though we are agnostic about the absolute value of the RRA measures, it should be noted 
that attitudes to risk and the RRA coefficient varies considerably between individuals, see e.g. 
Halek and Eisenhauer (2001), Cohen and Einav (2007) and Croson and Gneezy (2009). If we 
then take the Meyer and Meyer (2005) argument for a RRA coefficient around unity to be 
plausible and combine it with the considerable heterogeneity within the population, it may be 
reasonable to argue that one should expect to find a not insignificant number of individuals 
with a RRA coefficient below unity. Furthermore, there are good reasons to assume that 
contestants in tournaments are an adverse selection of the population. Females for instance, 
who tend to be less tolerant to risk, are less likely to partake in tournaments, see e.g. Levin et 
al. (1988) and Pålsson (1996). With high performers in the labour market being individuals 
who tend to have high levels of education, it becomes relevant to refer to the evidence of Shaw 
(1996) who found that human capital investment was negatively correlated with risk aversion. 
This might suggest that tournaments of high performers are likely to be an adverse selection of 
individuals who are relatively tolerant to risk as compared to the average individual in society. 
One of the more relevant papers in the literature for our purposes is Brenner (2015) who, in a 
large sample of US executives, find that the median executive has a RRA coefficient of 0.91.  
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3. A diagrammatic presentation of tournament gains. 
Tournament theory with risk neutral agents demonstrates that effort is higher, ceteris 
paribus, when the wage spread between the ‘winning’ wage w1 and the ‘losing’ wage w2 is 
greater. The average wage pays a scant role in the risk neutral analysis, apart from the obvious 
participation constraint considerations that specify the average wage must be at least as high 
as elsewhere. Matters are different when risk aversion is introduced and utility is a concave 
function of the wage. So though risk aversion is an assumption that usually can be dropped 
with ease in tournament theory as it merely tends to introduce unnecessary complexity 
without significant changes in results, there are a couple of nuances that in themselves are 
small, but when combined to study the effect of a tax imposition can be shown to make a 
significant difference to the determination of effort. The two key effects can be summarised in 
figure 1a and figure 1b. 
            Figure 1a                         Figure 1b 
            Same wage spread- different mean wage      A mean preserving wage spread 
    Utility       Utility    
 
                                                                           
                                                                                         ∆?̂?       ∆?̇? 
                        ?̇? 
                                 𝒂                       𝒂                                                                            ?̂? 
                                                                                  
                        ?̅̅̅?𝟐         ?̅̅̅?𝟏   ?̿̿̿?𝟐        ?̿̿̿?𝟏     wage                                       ?̂?𝟐   ?̇?𝟐        ?̇?𝟏      ?̂?𝟏    wage   
In figure 1a the wage spread 𝒂 is by given by 𝒂 = ?̅?1 − ?̅?2 = ?̿?1 − ?̿?2. It follows simply 
from this figure that the wage spread will yield a higher difference in utility when the mean 
wage is small, as is illustrated with ∆?̅? > ∆?̿?. A given wage spread has its largest effect on 
tournament effort when wages are low in the risk averse case, since the benefit of winning in 
U(w) 
   ∆?̿? 
∆?̅? 
U(w) 
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terms of utility is highest when wages are low. It is in effect a straightforward and rather trivial 
reflection of diminishing marginal utility that is absent from the more conventional risk 
neutral tournament analysis. The tournament theory implications of figure 1b are even less 
demanding. As more effort is induced the larger the difference between the benefit of winning 
and the value derived from losing, it follows that effort increases as the spread in utility 
widens. In other words reducing the mean preserving wage spread from ?̂? to ?̇? as in figure 1b 
reduces the spread in utility from ∆?̂? to ∆?̇?. This in turn reduces the effort of risk averse 
workers in the same predicable manner that is omnipresent in tournament theory with risk 
neutrality. 
The simple intuition associated with figures 1a and 1b, allows us to offer some conjectures 
about the effect of a proportional tax rate imposition on wages on the willingness to exert 
effort. We note the tax will yield a proportional decrease in the take home wage spread, that is 
the difference between the after tax income of a winner and a loser. For a risk neutral 
individual the reduction in the net of tax wage spread will affect effort adversely as the benefits 
of winning have diminished. For a risk averse individual matters are more complicated. Not 
only does a tax imposition compress the absolute spread as in figure 1b which affects effort 
adversely it also reduces the workers net average pay, as illustrated in figure 1a, affecting effort 
positively. Reducing the net wage spread is never positive for effort inducement ceteris 
paribus, as in figure 1b, whilst moving the spread further down the utility function will tend to 
increase effort levels, as in figure 1a. These two opposing effects are both at play when a 
proportional tax is imposed or increased and the workers are risk averse. Thus the interaction 
of these two simple effects yields an uncertainty in the effort response to a tax change that has 
previously been neglected in a tournament setting.  
Which or when either of the two effects dominates is at the heart of the theoretical 
arguments that follow. Though we have yet to provide the formal analysis, we can tentatively 
reflect on the utility effects of figures 1a and 1b. It is evident by casual observation of the 
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figures that the magnitudes of the effects are dependent on the shape, that is the concavity, of 
the utility function. For instance the effect of figure 1a becomes starker for more concave 
utility functions. Concavity in turn is a reflection of risk aversion. Thus the separating 
condition between effort inducing and effort preventing taxation will depend critically upon 
the level of risk aversion.                                                                      
 
4. Tournaments with risk aversion. 
We proceed with a formal, straightforward tournament model, allowing for either risk 
averse or risk neutral worker attitudes. Though worker characteristics may vary through the 
economy, we assume stratification implies firms construct pair-wise tournaments for 
observably identical workers. With the two workers denoted i and j, each choose effort level μi 
and μj respectively in response to the winner being rewarded the net income y1 and the loser 
being paid the net income y2. These net incomes are only realised after the tournament has 
ended, wages are paid and any taxes and transfers to and from the state have occurred. The 
firms cannot witness effort directly but can instead observe the worker outputs, qi and qj that 
are only imperfect proxies for effort: 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖           (1a) 
𝑞𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗           (1b) 
 Where the random noise components 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜀𝑗 are most usually referred to as luck. We 
follow the convention of the literature and assume the random noise components cannot be 
ascertained by workers in advance of effort being exerted.  
The winner of the tournament is the individual that has produced the most output. 
With identical competitors; the outcome is governed by a Nash equilibrium, where both 
workers exert the same level of effort. Though effort is invariant between individual 
competitors, the random elements typically differ, implying variation in outputs and thus pay. 
 In a departure from the majority of papers in the tournament literature we make no a 
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priori risk neutrality restrictions, but allow instead workers to be either risk neutral or averse. 
We assume that the objective function is separable in income and effort and that the workers’ 
individually identical objective is comprised of the expected utility of the tournament ‘gamble’ 
net of the cost of effort. The maximisation problem of worker i involves choosing the effort 
level that maximises the objective function Vi: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
   𝜇𝑖
                        𝑉𝑖 = 𝑝𝑢(𝑦1) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(𝑦2 ) − 𝐶(𝜇𝑖)      (2)
  Where p is the probability of winning the tournament, u(.) is the utility derived 
from the state dependent income and C(.) is the cost function that depends on effort. The 
utility u(.) of income is increasing and concave in income, whilst the cost of effort C(.) is 
increasing but convex in effort. The problem is symmetric for worker j. Thus the equivalent 
optimisation problem to expression (2) is omitted for worker j.  Worker i chooses the effort 
which is characterised by the following first order condition: 
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
=
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜇𝑖
(𝑢(𝑦1) − 𝑢(𝑦2)) − 𝐶
′(𝜇𝑖) = 0       (3) 
 It should be noted that the probability pprob(qi>qj) that worker i wins the 
tournament can be related to the cumulative distribution function, G, of the random variable 
𝜀𝑗 − 𝜀𝑖, since: p=prob(𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 > 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗)=prob(𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑗 > 𝜀𝑗 − 𝜀𝑖)=G(𝜀𝑗 − 𝜀𝑖 ). It is also worth 
emphasising the symmetric Nash equilibrium with identical agents implies that 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇𝑗. It 
follows that  
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜇𝑖
=
𝜕𝐺(0)
𝜕𝜇𝑖
= 𝑔(0). We can therefore rewrite (3) as: 
𝑔(0)(𝑢(𝑦1) − 𝑢(𝑦2)) − 𝐶
′(𝜇𝑖) = 0         (4) 
Expression (4) yields the usual result that effort will rise with a reduction of the 
importance of luck (an increase in g(0)). It also follows that effort increases when the spread of 
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payments widens, since an increase in the spread increases 𝑢(𝑦1) − 𝑢(𝑦2). 3  This result 
therefore translates directly from the usual rank order tournament literature. Such an outcome 
should come as no surprise, as it is clearly evident in the illustration given by figure 1b. 
However, the effect of an increase in the winner’s payment as compared to a reduction in the 
losers payment is no longer the same, as is normally the case in the standard tournament 
theory with risk neutrality. Instead we have: 
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑦1
=
𝑔(0)𝑢′(𝑦1)
−
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
≠
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑦2
=
𝑔(0)𝑢′(𝑦2)
𝜕2𝑉
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
     →
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑦1
= −
𝑢′(𝑦1)
𝑢′(𝑦2)
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑦2
             (5a) 
Where 
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2 =
𝜕2𝑝
𝜕𝜇𝑖2
(𝑢(𝑦1) − 𝑢(𝑦2)) − 𝐶"(𝜇𝑖) < 0  is a required second order condition 
for the maximisation of the worker’s objective function.4   
In order to gain further insight into the effects reflected by expression (5a), we note 
that the tournament firm does not set the winner and loser’s payments y1 and y2 directly. 
Instead the firm merely sets wages, and not the after tax (and transfers) income levels. With 
this in mind let the respective net incomes of winning and losing; y1=(1-t)w1+G and y2=(1-
t)w2+G be the two disposable state contingent income levels, where wi is the pre-tax state 
contingent wage, t is the marginal tax on labour income and the lump sum demogrant G is a 
transfer from the state. It is in other words a simple progressive tax rate system where the 
average tax increases with income. We can now evaluate the effect of wages on effort: 
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑤1
=
𝑔(0)(1−𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦1)
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇2
≠
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑤2
=
𝑔(0)(1−𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦2)
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇2
     →
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑤1
= −
𝑢′(𝑦1)
𝑢′(𝑦2)
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑤2
            (5b) 
With strict concavity of the utility function, expressions (5a) and (5b) imply the effect 
on effort of reducing the losers’ income will be stronger than the effect on effort of an increase 
                                                          
3
 This follows since  
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖𝜕𝑦1
= 𝑔(0)𝑢′(𝑦1) > 0, 
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖𝜕𝑦2
= −𝑔(0)𝑢′(𝑦2) > 0  and 𝐶
"(𝜇𝑖) > 0. 
4 We assume in the remainder of this paper that higher order derivatives of this probability are all 
equated to zero. 
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of the winner’s income. As incentives are the strongest at lower wages, it could imply a 
tougher race to the bottom than what is commonly described in the literature. That is, 
tournament firms facing risk averse workers may prefer a wage spread with lower average 
wages for effort consideration alone, though the firms are still restricted from setting wages 
too low by the workers’ participation constraint, as they also would be in the standard case 
when they face risk neutral workers. 
Whilst firms set wages, the state sets taxes and transfers. These then jointly determine 
the net payment spread that influences effort. It is for this reason we may also be interested in 
the ceteris paribus supply side effect on effort of increases in taxes and transfers. By totally 
differentiating expression (4) above we can derive the effects of such changes on effort: 
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝐺
=
𝑔(0)(𝑢′(𝑦1)−𝑢′(𝑦2))
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
≤ 0         (6a) 
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑡
=
−𝑔(𝑂)((𝑤1)𝑢′(𝑦1)−(𝑤2)𝑢′(𝑦2))
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
         (6b) 
It is apparent the second order derivative in the denominator, common in both 
expressions above, has to be positive in order to satisfy the second order conditions for a 
maximum. Whilst expression (6a) is unambiguously positive, and implies increases in 
government transfers acts as a disincentive to exert effort,5 signing expression (6b) is more 
problematic. This latter expression (6b) can be positive or negative. With risk neutrality, 
where wu’(y)=w, it follows that since w1>w2 that the sign of expression (6b) is less than zero. 
That is, under the normal risk neutrality assumption in the literature, a proportional tax rate 
increase would reduce the level of effort. This negative relationship does however not 
necessarily hold when we depart from risk neutrality and allow more general specifications of 
utility that include the possibility of risk aversion. Since we know the sign of the relationship 
between effort and taxes depends on the numerator we can now write: 
                                                          
5
 Strict inequality of expression (6a) applies if we exclude the possibility of risk neutrality. 
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𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑡
⋛ 0  if  𝑤1𝑢′(𝑦1) − 𝑤2𝑢′(𝑦2) ⋚ 0        (7a) 
With 𝑤1 > 𝑤2 this in turn implies: 
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑡
⋛ 0 if   
𝜕(𝑤𝑢′(𝑦))
𝜕𝑤
⋚ 0                    (7b) 
The condition as expressed by (7b) therefore depends on: 
𝜕(𝑤𝑢′(𝑦))
𝜕𝑤
= 𝑢′(𝑦) + (1 − 𝑡)𝑤𝑢"(𝑦) 
= 𝑢′(𝑦) + (𝐺 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑤)𝑢"(y)-Gu"(𝑦) 
= 𝑢′(𝑦)(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐴)-Gu"(𝑦)                   (8) 
Where the relative risk aversion coefficient RRA, is such that RRA= −
𝑦𝑢"(𝑦)
𝑢′(𝑦)
.  We can 
from expressions (7b) and (8) make several observations. First, note with risk neutrality that 
both RRA and the second order derivative of the utility function are zero. Here the derivative 
on the left hand side of expression (8) is strictly positive if RRA equals zero.  Thus effort will 
decrease with tax rises for the risk neutral.  Second, it follows by extension that effort will also 
fall in response to higher taxes, with risk aversion when the RRA is less or equal to one and 
transfers from the state are positive. Third, matters are more complex when RRA exceeds 
unity. Here effort could either increase or decrease depending on the relative opposing effects 
in (8). Fourth, and however, consider the simplified case where government transfers are 
insignificant and set equal to zero. Such a situation may be more plausible than it first appears, 
when one considers the increasing trend for means tested benefits, which are only paid out to 
individuals under a certain threshold income. With tournaments occurring at the top end of 
the income distribution it is therefore possible that the effective transfers to both individual 
tournament participants are close to zero.  Under such circumstances we can write. 
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑡
⋛ 0  if  RRA⋛1   when G=0        (9) 
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Here effort will increase in response to rising proportional tax rates as long as the 
relative risk aversion exceeds unity. Thus despite the fact that the wage spread is decreasing, 
the more risk averse participant, with a RRA exceeding unity (and G=0), will seek more self-
protection through higher effort levels. The converse is true for lower relative risk aversion 
coefficients, below unity. Again we refer to the simple intuition that accompanies figures 1a 
and 1b. The overall effect of a tax increase on the spread of utility is a compound effect: 
Though a tax increase always renders the worker worse off irrespective of the risk aversion 
coefficient, it will increase the spread between winning and losing in terms of utility for 
sufficiently concave utility functions. This will therefore have the novel effort increasing effect 
in response to higher taxes. And it is this simple intuitive result which sets this paper apart 
and which drives some of the remaining results. It is worth reminding ourselves of the 
literature which typically have, according to Meyer and Meyer (2005) risk aversion coefficients 
close to but exceeding unity, but nevertheless noting the considerable heterogeneity amongst 
individuals. Linking tournament theory to CEO pay it is therefore constructive to note again 
Brenner (2015) who found that top executives typically have risk aversion coefficients less than 
unity, implying that top executives are likely to respond to higher taxes by reducing their 
effort level.  
Restricting our analysis to the case when the transfers from the state are zero may 
matter less than what one might expect, as relaxing this assumption will retain the same 
qualitative results. Indeed it remains the case when G>0 that the more risk averse the 
individual is the more likely it is that effort will increase with taxes. However, the critical 
relative risk aversion coefficient where workers above which they increase effort in response to 
tax increases has change somewhat. We now note that a RRA=1 will yield lower effort in 
response to tax-rises when G>0. Sufficiently more risk averse individuals will however respond 
to higher taxes by exerting more effort levels as previously anticipated. Whilst we will look at 
the case of G>0, when we discuss the balanced budget approach below, we will in order to 
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keep matters simple in section 5 return to the case where the tournament contesting 
individuals have incomes above the means tested threshold so that they receive no 
government transfers.  
This is not all, however. Both transfers and taxes will also influence the effectiveness of 
wage spreads on effort. Thus a series of comparative statics results follow which in turn can be 
compared and contrasted to results found in previous literature: 
𝜕2𝜇𝑖
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝐺
=
𝑔(0)(1−𝑡)𝑢"(𝑦1)
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
 <0        (10a) 
𝜕2𝜇𝑖
𝜕𝑤2𝜕𝐺
=
−𝑔(0)(1−𝑡)𝑢"(𝑦2)
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
>0        (10b) 
𝜕2𝜇𝑖
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝑡
=
−𝑔(0)((1−𝑡)𝑤1𝑢"(𝑦1)+𝑢
′(𝑦1))
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
=
−𝑔(0)𝑢′(𝑦1)(1−𝑅𝑅𝐴)−𝑔(0)𝐺𝑢"(𝑦1)
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
⋛ 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝐴 ⋛ 1  
                 and G=0 (10c) 
𝜕2𝜇𝑖
𝜕𝑤2𝜕𝑡
=
𝑔(0)((1−𝑡)𝑤2𝑢"(𝑦2)+𝑢
′(𝑦2))
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
=
𝑔(0)𝑢′(𝑦2)(1−𝑅𝑅𝐴)−𝑔(0)𝐺𝑢"(𝑦1)
−
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
  ⋚ 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝐴 ⋛ 1  
   and G=0     (10d) 
 
Expressions (10a) and (10b) together demonstrate that the effect a given wage spread 
has on effort depends on the level of transfers from the state. In short; effort falls for a given 
pre-tax wage spread if transfers from the state increase. There is nothing particularly 
surprising or novel about this result, which simply says that transfers from the state to both 
winner and losers acts as a disincentive to effort levels, or more precisely that increasing the 
wage spread will have a smaller effect on effort when transfers are high.  
More interesting is the supply side effect of the wage spread on effort as taxes vary, that 
is reflected by expressions (10c) and (10d). Here the effect of the wage spread on effort will vary 
dependent on both taxes and the relative risk aversion coefficient. When the RRA is greater 
than one, we know from before that effort will increase with taxes, whereas the opposite is the 
case when it is less than unity. Now for the first time we can deduce that an increase in tax will 
magnify the effect of a change in the wage spread has on effort when the RRA is greater unity. 
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Here an increase in the wage spread will have a bigger effect on effort when taxes are high. 
This should be contrasted to the case when the RRA is less than one, where the wage spread 
effect on effort falls as taxes increase.  
Before we proceed with the analysis of how firms respond it may be useful to 
investigate the special case where the tax revenues collected in the tournament are used to 
finance the government transfers to the tournament participants. 
 
A balanced tax budget tournament. 
  Assume now that the contract is such that the taxes generated from the winner and 
loser in the tournament, benefit nobody outside the tournament but are instead only used to 
pay for the transfers the two competing workers receive from the state. We refer to this as a 
balanced tax budget tournament. Note in the vast majority of cases that this is fairly 
implausible. For instance it is unlikely that a well-paid worker, who is competing for a CEO 
position but who is unsuccessful, will be in a net positive receipt of transfers from the state. It 
is likewise unlikely that a tournament lower down the income distribution is such that the net 
tax liability is exactly offset between winner and loser. Though it is not particularly realistic 
and will not be used extensively in what follows in the following sections, it is a useful 
benchmark. So leaving plausibility aside for the time being, consider a two person world where 
government taxes equals transfers, such that the average transfer G is given by G=t(w1+w2)/2. 
An increase in government involvement is then reflected by a high t which thereby facilitates a 
higher G.  Now expression (4) reflects the optimal choice of effort also in the balanced budget 
case. Using this and noting that 𝑢(𝑦1) = 𝑢 ((1 −
1
2
𝑡)𝑤1 +
1
2
𝑡𝑤2) and 𝑢(𝑦2) = 𝑢 ((1 −
1
2
𝑡)𝑤2 +
1
2
𝑡𝑤1) we can investigate a balance budget increase in tax on individual supply side effort: 
𝑑𝜇𝑖
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑔(0)
1
2
(𝑤1−𝑤2)(𝑢′(𝑦1)+𝑢′(𝑦2))
𝜕2𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝜇𝑖
2
<0        (11) 
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We therefore arrive at the result that increasing taxes and benefits will reduce effort 
levels. Though this result concludes that greater state involvement is associated with lower 
levels of effort, it is predicated on a highly stylised tournament model where the winner’s net 
contribution in taxes exactly offsets the loser’s net gain in transfers. In a society with just two 
members or types of workers this interpretation may make perfect sense. Here the poorest 
citizen, the loser of the tournament, gets a net transfer from the richest in society, the winner 
of the tournament. However in a more realistic setting a balanced budget approach may be 
stretching the model a little too far. Tournaments within firms are seldom organised in such a 
way that competing participants contain both individuals who come from the top and the 
bottom end of the wage distribution. Indeed, as follows from previous discussion, this is hardly 
representative of most labour contracts or tournament contests within firms. Again we appeal 
to the argument that tournament theory is more appropriate for the upper levels of a firm’s 
hierarchy where there is a relative high rate of promotion internally, see e.g. Baker et al. 
(1994a, 1994b). Thus a worker who partakes in a tournament at the upper levels of a firm 
hierarchy, which the worker ends up losing, is still likely to remain a high income earner who 
in a progressive tax system will remain a net contributor of taxes. We will therefore, in 
contrast to the monopsonistic analysis contained in Persson and Sandmo (2005), not 
investigate the balanced budget approach further but instead proceed in the following section 
with the unbalanced budget approach, where G=0. 
 
5. The choice of wage spread. 
We have so far restricted our study to supply side effects only. This leaves the analysis far 
from complete, for to determine the resulting wage distribution it is not enough to merely 
know how much effort workers exert at a given wage spread or how workers change their 
effort in taxation regimes. We must also consider actions by the tournament firm, that is we 
must include demand side behaviour to complete our investigations. Whereas workers on the 
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supply side choose their optimal effort in the response to the wage profile within the firm, the 
firm sets the wage profile optimally in order to maximise profits. By incorporating the firm’s 
decision making into our model, as outlined below, we are able to close the model and pin 
down the wage distribution at the top end of the firm’s hierarchy, to further draw inferences 
about the effect of the tax system on top earners. 
When the firm sets the wage spread in the tournament he does so in the full knowledge of 
how the workers will respond, the manner of which is outlined above, with the sole purpose of 
maximising profits. Noting the expected output is identical to effort and normalising prices to 
one, the ex ante profit the firm derives from each homogenous worker is simply the effort less 
the expected average wage. We assume that the optimisation programme facing the firm is 
such that the firm will seek to maximise its profit, π, subject to the workers’ participation 
constraint that specify the value, V, to the representative worker of a tournament has to 
exceed his outside (employment) option ?̅?.6 Thus the following optimisation programme 
applies: 
  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑊1,𝑊2    𝜋 =  μ − (
1
2
𝑤1 +
1
2
w2)            (12) 
s.t.    𝑝𝑢((1 − 𝑡)𝑤1 + 𝐺) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢((1 − 𝑡)𝑤2 + 𝐺) − 𝐶(𝜇) ≥ ?̅? 
A standard Lagrangean ℒ , with the associated Lagrangean multiplier λ, is then 
straightforwardly defined. Optimisation follows simply and is reflected in the resulting first 
order conditions: 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆
= ?̅? − {𝑝𝑢((1 − 𝑡)𝑤1 + 𝐺) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢((1 − 𝑡)𝑤2 + 𝐺) − 𝐶(𝜇)} = 0  (13a) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑤1
=
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑤1
− 𝜆
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑤1
  
       =
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑤1
−
1
2
− 𝜆 (𝑝(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦1) +
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑤1
(
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜇
(𝑢(𝑦1) − 𝑢(𝑦2)) − 𝐶
′(𝜇𝑖))) = 0   
           (13b) 
                                                          
6
 We henceforth drop the subscript i, as workers are identical. 
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𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑤2
= 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑤2
− 𝜆
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑤2
  
        =
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑤2
−
1
2
 − 𝜆 ((1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦2) +
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑤2
(
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜇
(𝑢(𝑦1) − 𝑢(𝑦2)) − 𝐶
′(𝜇))) = 0 
(13c) 
 This system of equations then characterises the chosen wage spread in the tournament. 
By applying risk neutrality, where 𝑢′(𝑦1) = 𝑢
′(𝑦2) = 1, to the above expressions it follows that 
we have 𝐶′(𝜇) = 1 − 𝑡, recovering the optimising expression from Persson and Sandmo (2005). 
However, with risk aversion of workers matters are a little more complicated. In order to 
proceed we make three observations and/or assumptions. First, given the identical workers, 
both have an equal probability of winning or losing the tournament, that is p= ½. Second, 
from previously, by the application of the envelope theorem, we have  
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝜇
((𝑢(𝑦1) − 𝑢(𝑦2)) −
𝐶′(𝜇))=0. Third, we assume a symmetric tax incidence so that taxes/benefits affect the 
tournament and outside option in equal measures, that is 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
 and 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝐺
=
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝐺
. 7  By total 
differentiation of the first order conditions we derive the following matrix equation: 
A[
𝑑𝜆/𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑤1/𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑤2/𝑑𝑡
]=bt         (14) 
Where:  
A=
[
 
 
 
 
−
0 −
1
2
(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦1) −
1
2
(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦2)
1
2
(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦1)
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤1
2 −
𝜆
2
(1 − 𝑡)2𝑢"(𝑦1)
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝑤2
= 0
−
1
2
(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦2)
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝑤2
= 0
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤2
2 −
𝜆
2
(1 − 𝑡)2𝑢"(𝑦2)]
 
 
 
 
 
bt=
[
 
 
 
 
0
−
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝑡
−
1
2
𝜆(𝑢′(𝑦1) + (1 − 𝑡)𝑤1𝑢"(𝑦1))
−
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤2𝜕𝑡
−
1
2
𝜆(𝑢′(𝑦2) + (1 − 𝑡)𝑤2𝑢"(𝑦2))]
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
7
 This is not as much an assumption as it follows from the envelope theorem that if the workers optimise their 
effort within the firm and as well as in the outside option firm that  
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝜇
= 0  and  
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝜇
= 0. It then follows that   
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝑡
= 0, 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝑡
= 0,  
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝐺
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝐺
= 0 and 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝐺
=
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝐺
= 0. 
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Note that the determinant of the bordered Hessian A has to be positive in order to 
satisfy the requirement for a maximum. 8  That is: |𝐴| = −(
1
2
(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦2))
2
{
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤1
2 −
𝜆
2
(1 − 𝑡)2𝑢"(𝑦1)} − (
1
2
(1 − 𝑡)𝑢′(𝑦1))
2
{
𝜕2𝜇
𝜕𝑤2
2 −
𝜆
2
(1 − 𝑡)2𝑢"(𝑦2)}  >0. 
Let us consider the case where government transfers are means tested so that G=0.9 
There are then two separating cases to consider; first when the relative risk aversion (RRA) 
coefficient is less than unity and second when it is (sufficiently) greater than unity. 
 
Case 1; when RRA<1.   
We refer to the appendix where it is shown that |𝐴2
𝑡 | < 0 when RRA<1. Thus by 
Cramer’s rule we have  
𝑑𝑤1
𝑑𝑡
=
|𝐴2
𝑡 |
|𝐴|
<0, when RRA<1. In this case an increase in taxes will reduce 
the wage offered to winning workers by the firm. Thus more redistribution reduces the wages 
of the top earners. We also note that  |𝐴3| > 0.  Thus by Cramer’s rule we have  
𝑑𝑤2
𝑑𝑡
>0, when 
RRA<1. That is, as taxes increase the firm will for these worker preferences increase the losers’ 
wage. We now denote the before tax wage spread as 𝑅 =
𝑤1
𝑤2
. The effect on this wage spread of 
an increase in tax-rates can be shown to be given as: 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑤1
𝑑𝑡
𝑤2−𝑤1
𝑑𝑤2
𝑑𝑡
𝑤22
. This is unambiguously 
negative as long as RRA<1. It is now evident the before tax wage distribution, between winners 
and losers, narrows with an increase in tax. Intuitively, as figures 1a and 1b illustrate, the 
relative gain between winning and losing falls with higher taxes when the relative risk aversion 
coefficient is low enough. This then implies that if the relative risk aversion coefficient is less 
than unity effort falls, as is demonstrated by expression (9). Hence the relative gain to the firm 
of increasing wage dispersion falls for the firm, as reflected by expressions (10c) and (10d) 
                                                          
8
 All the derivations of subsequent determinants required for our results are given in the Appendix. 
9
 This is merely done for simplicity to shorten the proofs in the appendix and to provide a clearer and simpler 
discussion. Relaxing this restriction has no qualitative effect on the results. Of the two following cases, Case 1 
remains unchanged when G>0, whereas in Case 2 the relative risk aversion coefficient would have to be 
sufficiently above unity for the same results to carry through when G>0. 
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when RRA<1. Firms therefore reduce the wage spread in response to higher taxes when risk 
aversion is low.  For the sake of completeness it is a result that also holds in the limit when the 
worker is risk neutral.10  
Note now that this case results in a consistency with the empirical regularity of tax 
rates and top income earnings being negatively correlated, when taken together with Brenner’s 
(2015), finding that top executives have RRA’s falling short of unity. Indeed, it follows from the 
above theoretical results that reductions in taxes will imply top earners, the winners of the 
tournament, will earn more both before and after taxes. As taxes fall the top earners increase 
their effort, whilst firms respond by increasing the wage spread in the tournament. 
 
Case 2; when RRA>1. 
 When on the other hand RRA>1 the results are diametrically opposed to Case 1. Note it 
follows from (9) that effort increases with higher taxation for the more risk averse, that is  
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝑡
> 0 when RRA>1. As the appendix shows |𝐴2
𝑡 | > 0 and |𝐴3| < 0  when RRA>1 we have by 
applying Cramer’s rule both 
𝑑𝑤1
𝑑𝑡
>0, and 
𝑑𝑤2
𝑑𝑡
<0. The effect of taxes on the wage spread of an 
increase in tax-rates, 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑤1
𝑑𝑡
𝑤2−𝑤1
𝑑𝑤2
𝑑𝑡
𝑤22
 is therefore unambiguously positively as long as RRA>1. 
Here the firms respond to tax rate changes by increasing the wage spread. This is again 
reflected by the findings of expression (10c) and (10d) that sees the effect of increasing the 
wage spread is amplified by higher taxes when RRA>1. Any increase in taxation for 
redistributive purposes would in this case of relative high risk aversion lead to the unintended 
perverse consequence of increasing the spread between the winner and loser of wage contests, 
which in turn will lead to within firm inequality. 
                                                          
10 Whilst this finding may at first appear to contradict Persson and Sandmo (2005) it should be noted their 
monopsony result was predicated on a balanced budget approach in contrast to the unbalanced budget 
framework in the present model.   
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 A response to a drop in taxes could perversely be met by a reduction of effort in this 
case, that leads the firm to find it less profitable to maintain a high wage spread. The firm 
therefore could choose to offer a more compressed tournament wage structure to the more 
risk averse following a fall in taxes. If firms are able to statistical discriminate between groups, 
it could turn out to have important equity implications. For the winning individuals belonging 
to more risk averse groups, such as females and non-executives, could very well see the gains 
of winning a tournament being diminished with falling taxes. It links to the literature on 
female executive pay, which typically finds females receive lower remuneration than their male 
counterparts, see e.g.  Elkinawy and Stater (2011) who interestingly find that this difference is 
more pronounced for lower level executives. This is consistent with our results and Brenner’s 
(2015) finding that lower level executives are on average more risk averse than higher level 
executives. 
 
Overall remarks concerning both cases.  
By considering Case 1 and Case 2 together a certain sense of fairness follows. Taxes reduce 
effort levels for low risk aversion workers. In this event the workers are doubly punished: First 
by the lower disposable income taxes imply and then second by the firm’s response of further 
lowering the top earning/winner’s wage. The story is opposite for highly risk averse individuals 
who respond to higher taxes by increasing their effort, for which they are at least partially 
compensated by an increase in their top earning wage. In summary both cases illustrate a 
reward to effort, through the positive relationship between effort and the top earner’s 
remuneration. If we therefore believe our tournament explanation of the rise in remuneration 
of top earners is a consequence of the drop in taxes, it is worth noting that this rise in wages 
has not been costless to these executives who now exert more effort than previously. 
The overall effect of taxes on tournament wages and the distribution of wages within firms 
are complicated. With the top executive in a firm being the ultimate winner of the tournament 
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structure within a firm, and in the terms of Rosen (1981) the ‘superstar’, the effect of the 
reduction in taxes on top executive pay may be easily predictable. For if we appeal to Brenner 
(2015) who finds that the median relative risk aversion coefficient is 0.91 for executives within 
firms and top executives having lower risk aversion on average, Case 1 is simply applicable, 
implying higher CEO remuneration in response to a drop in the marginal tax rate on wages. 
Thus our model fits the data well. However, the effect of the tax reduction on wages lower 
down a firm hierarchy may be less easy to ascertain. Here, it is possibly with support of 
Brenner, who find lower level executives are more likely to be more risk averse, that the 
relative risk aversion coefficient could exceed unity. We are then in the realms of Case 2 which 
should see a wage compression as a result of the tax reduction. In other words, the winners of 
the lower level executive tournament will experience lower wages and the losers higher wages 
as a result of the tax reductions. Hence some workers lower down the hierarchy will 
experience lower whereas others higher wages. As a result the overall tax effect on the wage of 
any tournament participating lower level executive is a priori uncertain. We note that this 
complexity mirrors the empirical results of Saez (2004) for the US 1960-2000 who finds 
significant effects of the marginal tax rate on the top 1 % of earners’ income share, whilst very 
small effects on the top 1%-5% and the top 5%-10% earner’s income share. In his and in our 
paper; clarity and the effect of taxes on wages is more striking for the top earners, whilst 
matters are more complex lower down the income distribution, 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion. 
We have shown in the following paper that tournament workers’ risk attitudes are important 
in determining their supply side effort response to changes in the marginal tax rate on labour 
income.  This will in turn influence the firm’s design of tournaments so that the wage spread 
within single tournaments should narrow with increasing taxes for the relatively less risk 
averse participant and conversely widen with the relatively more risk averse participant. With 
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CEO’s being relatively less risk averse than other groups in society it may therefore be true 
that top earners’ income is negatively related to the tax rate. Thus we argue the wage 
distribution should narrow in response to tax rises within the upper parts of the firm’s 
hierarchy. We conjecture as this happens in each firm with tournaments as an incentive 
mechanism for top executives that within society there will be a compression at the top end of 
the wage distribution as taxes increase and conversely a widening as taxes fall. The analysis 
provides a taxation reason for the empirical observation of the increasing remuneration of top 
earners over the last few decades in response to lower taxation. Furthermore work attitudes to 
risk matters to how firms choose to design competitive tournaments, implying that 
participants who belong to more risk averse groups, such as females and lower level 
executives, should have seen a compression of their wages in response to the experience of 
falling tax rates whilst at the same time seen a fall in the top wage they could potentially earn.  
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APPENDIX  
Assume throughout appendix that G=0. 
Sign of |𝐴2
𝑡 |: 
Define 𝐀2
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Determinant of A2 is from (14) given by: 
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Thus (A2), (10c) and (10d) imply |𝐴2
𝑡 |>0 when RRA >1, whilst |𝐴2
𝑡 |<0 when RRA <1. 
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Thus it follows from (A3), (10c) and (10d) that |𝐴3|<0 when RRA >1, whilst it follows that |𝐴3|>0 
when RRA <1. 
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